We must now examine the opposite vices: first, anger, which is contrary to meekness; secondly, cruelty, which is contrary to gentleness.

With regard to anger, there are eight points:

1) is it legal to be angry;

2) whether anger is a sin;

3) whether it is a mortal sin;

4) whether it is the most serious sin;

5) its types;

6) whether anger is a major vice;

7) about his daughters;

8) whether there is an opposite vice.

Section 1. Is it legal to be angry?

The situation with the first [statement] is as follows.

Objection 1. It seems to be illegal to be angry. Thus, Jerome, commenting on the words [of Scripture]: “Everyone who is angry with his brother...” (Matt. 5:22), says: “In some manuscripts the word “in vain” is added. However, in those manuscripts that are recognized as authentic, there is no such restriction and anger is generally prohibited. Therefore, it is illegal to be angry.

Objection 2. Further, according to Dionysius, "evil of the soul without cause" ⁴⁷² . But anger is always unreasonable; so, according to the philosopher, “anger will not hear the voice of judgment” ⁴⁷³ ; and Gregory says: “When anger splits the serene surface of the soul, it shreds and tears it in its fury” ⁴⁷⁴ ; and Cassian says, "An outburst of anger, whatever its cause, overwhelms and blinds the eye of the mind." Therefore, anger is evil.

Objection 3. Further, a gloss on the words [of Scripture]: "Do not be at enmity against your brother in your heart" (Lev. 19:17), says that anger is "the desire for revenge." But the desire for revenge is illegal insofar as revenge belongs to God, according to what is said [in Scripture], "Vengeance is with me" (Deut. 32:35). Therefore, it seems that anger is always evil.

Objection 4. Moreover, everything that causes us to deviate from becoming like God is always evil. But anger causes us to shy away from becoming like God, because, according to what is said [in Scripture], God judges indulgently (Wis. 12:18). Therefore, anger is always evil.

This is contradicted by Chrysostom's saying that "one who is angry unreasonably exposes himself to danger, but one who is angry for a reason does not, because if there were no anger, then instructions would be vain, judgments would be changeable, crimes would be unpunished." Therefore, anger is not always evil.

I answer: anger in the strict sense of the word is the passion of sensual desire and gives its name to the irritable faculty, as we have already said (ΙΙ–Ι, 46, 1) when considering the passions. As for the passions of the soul, evil can be revealed in them in two ways. First, in terms of the kind of passion she receives from her object. Thus, envy from the point of view of the species always means evil, since it is the unwillingness of the good to another, and such unwillingness is in itself contrary to reason, in connection with which the philosopher notes that “the very name of envy expresses a bad quality” ⁴⁷⁵ . But this does not apply in any way to anger, which is the desire for revenge, since revenge may or may not be desired justifiably. Secondly, evil can be detected in passion by the amount of passion, which may be excessive or insufficient. In this sense, evil can be present in anger, namely, when someone is angry more or less than right reason requires. But if a person becomes angry in accordance with the judgment of right reason, then his anger is commendable.

Reply to Objection 1. The Stoics, as we have shown above in the discussion of the passions (ΙΙ-Ι, 24, 2), maintained that anger and all other passions are mental disturbances that are contrary to the order of reason, and therefore they considered anger to be equal to like other passions, evil. Jerome also understands anger in this way, since he speaks of it as that by means of which one is angry with one's neighbor in order to harm him. But the Peripatetics, whose opinion is shared by Augustine ⁴⁷⁶ , considered anger and other passions of the soul to be movements of sensual desire, which are sometimes moderated by reason, and sometimes not, and in this sense anger is not always evil.

Reply to objection 2. Anger can be related to judgment in two ways. First, as a precursor to it, and then it can deprive the mind of its rightness and acquire a sign of evil. Secondly, as following it, in view of the fact that the movement of sensual desire is directed against vice and in accordance with reason, and then this anger is good and is called "zealous anger." In this connection Gregory says: “When we resort to anger as an instrument of virtue, we must beware that it does not take precedence over reason and precede it as its master, instead of following its instructions and being ready to obey it in everything. like a good servant" ⁴⁷⁷ . This last anger, while in some way hindering the judgment of the mind with regard to the performance of the act, does not, however, deprive the mind of its correctness. Therefore, according to Gregory, "zealous anger troubles the eye of reason, while sinful anger blinds it" ⁴⁷⁸ . However, it is not incompatible with virtue that the reflection of the mind is interrupted by the execution of what the mind thinks, since art can also be hindered by its act if it begins to think about what should be done, while it should be done.

Reply to Objection 3. It is unlawful to desire vengeance for the sake of doing wrong to one who is to be punished, but to desire vengeance for the sake of correcting a vice in the name of the good of justice is commendable, to which sensual desire may incline as far as it is moved by reason. When revenge is carried out in accordance with the order of judgment, it is the work of God, since, as it is said [in Scripture], he who has the power to punish is “the servant of God” (Rom. 13:4).

Response to objection 4. We can and should be similar to God from the side of the desire for the good, but we cannot be fully likened to Him from the side of the mode of our desire, since God, unlike us, does not have any sensual desire, the movement of which must be subordinated to the mind. Therefore, Gregory says that “anger rises most decisively against vice when it bows before the prescription of reason” ⁴⁷⁹ .

Section 2. Is anger a sin?

The second situation is as follows.

Objection 1. It seems that anger is not a sin. Indeed, when we sin, we lose merit. Then, as it is said in the second [book] of the Ethics, “for passions we deserve neither praise nor condemnation” ⁴⁸⁰ . Thus passion is not a sin. But in the treatise on passions we have already shown (ΙΙ–Ι, 46, 1) that anger is a passion. Therefore, anger is not a sin.

Objection 2. Further, in every sin there is an appeal to some transient good. But in anger there is an appeal not to a transient good, but to someone else's evil. Therefore, anger is not a sin.

Objection 3. Further, Augustine says that "no one sins in that which cannot be avoided" ⁴⁸¹ . But man cannot avoid anger. So, the gloss on the words [of Scripture]: "Be angry, do not sin" (Ps. 4:5), notes: "The movement of anger is not subject to us." And the philosopher says: "Acting in anger, everyone experiences suffering" ⁴⁸² . But suffering is against the will. Therefore, anger is not a sin.

Objection 4. Moreover, according to Damascene, sin is contrary to nature ⁴⁸³ . But anger, being a natural act of human ability, namely irritability, is not contrary to nature, in connection with which Jerome notes in his letter that "anger is characteristic of man." Therefore, anger is not a sin.

This is contradicted by the following words of the apostle: "All irritation, and rage, and wrath . .. let them be put away from you" (Eph. 4:31).

I answer: as already said (1), anger in the strict sense of the word means passion. The passion of the sensual desire for the good, to the extent that it is directed by reason, and if it leaves the order of reason, it becomes evil. Then, the order of the mind in relation to anger can be seen in terms of two things. First, in terms of the desired object to which anger inclines, namely revenge. Thus, if a person desires that revenge be carried out in accordance with the order of reason, then his anger is worthy of praise and is called "zealous anger." On the other hand, if he desires such vengeance as is contrary to the order of reason, for example, if he desires to punish someone undeservedly, or more than he deserved, or in violation of the order prescribed by law, or not for the proper purpose, namely the protection of the right and the correction of vice, then his anger is sinful and is called "sinful anger."

Secondly, the order of reason in relation to anger can be considered from the point of view of the mode of anger in the sense that the movement of anger should not be excessively cruel either internally or externally, and if this condition is not observed, then anger will be sinful even in that where the vengeance itself is justified.

Reply to Objection 1. As long as passion can be ordered by reason and not, it follows that in the absolute sense of the word passion does not contain the concept of merit or demerit, as well as praise or condemnation. But as ordered by reason, it can be in a certain sense a virtue and deserve praise, and, on the other hand, as not ordered by reason, it can be a disadvantage and deserve condemnation. Therefore, the philosopher says that “if someone is praised or blamed for anger, then for this particular anger” ⁴⁸⁴ .

Reply to Objection 2. An angry person desires harm to another, not for his own benefit, but for the sake of revenge, to which desire inclines him as to some transient good.

Reply to Objection 3. Man is master of his own actions through the judgment of his mind. Therefore, he has no power to completely prevent those movements that precede this judgment, namely, to prevent them from arising, although his mind is able to check any of them after it has arisen. Therefore, the words that the movement of anger is not subject to us refer to movements that have not yet arisen. However, since these movements are to some extent still subject to us, they, not being regulated, cannot be considered completely sinless. The philosopher's statement that the angry one suffers means that he suffers not from anger, but from what he thinks has been wronged, and this suffering prompts him to desire revenge.

Reply to Objection 4. The irritable faculty in man is by nature subordinate to his reason, and therefore a human act is natural insofar as it is in accordance with reason, and insofar as it is contrary to reason, it is also contrary to human nature.

Section 3. Is anger a mortal sin?

The situation with the third [provision] is as follows.

Objection 1. All anger seems to be a mortal sin. After all, it is said [in Scripture]: “Anger kills a fool” (Job. 5:2) (here we are talking about spiritual murder, after which mortal sin is called). Therefore, any anger is a mortal sin.

Objection 2. Further, only mortal sin deserves eternal condemnation. But anger deserves eternal condemnation; thus, the Lord says: “Everyone who is angry with his brother ... is subject to judgment” (Matt. 5:22), and the gloss on this passage notes that “those three things that are discussed here, namely, judgment, advice and hellfire, unequivocally show us the various dwelling places of those in a state of eternal damnation, corresponding to different sins. Therefore, anger is a mortal sin.

Objection 3. Further, everything that is contrary to heavenly love is a mortal sin. But anger is contrary to heavenly love, because, as Jerome says, commenting on the words [of Scripture]: "Everyone who is angry with his brother ...", etc. (Matt. 5:22), he is contrary to love of one's neighbor. Therefore, anger is a mortal sin.

This is contradicted by the following : a gloss on the words [of the psalm]: "When angry, do not sin" (Ps. 4:5), says: "Anger is forgivable if it does not move to action."

I answer: as we have already shown (2), the movement of anger can be disordered and sinful in two ways. First, on the part of the desired object, as when one desires unrighteous revenge, and then anger is a mortal sin in kind, because it is contrary to love and justice. However, sometimes even such anger can be a venial sin due to the imperfection of the act. This imperfection can be seen either in relation to the subject of the desire for revenge, as when the movement of anger precedes the judgment of his mind, or in relation to the desired object, as when one desires revenge so insignificant that it is not worth taking into account, so that even if he proceeds to act, such as scolding a child or doing something similar, then this is not a mortal sin. Secondly, the movement of anger may be disordered on the part of the mode of anger, as, for example, when one becomes too fiercely angry in one's soul or oversteps one's limits in one's outward manifestations of anger. Such anger, not being a mortal sin by nature, is in some cases a mortal sin, as, for example, when, because of the violence of his anger, a person falls away from love for God and neighbor.

Reply to Objection 1. From the above words it does not follow that all anger is a mortal sin, but that fools are spiritually killed by anger, because, not restraining the movement of anger with reason, they fall into mortal sins, for example, blaspheming God or causing damage neighbor.

Reply to Objection 2. The Lord's words about anger complete the words of the Law: “Whoever kills is subject to judgment” (Matthew 5:21). Therefore, the Lord in this case speaks of that movement of anger, through which a person desires to kill or cause some other grave harm to his neighbor, and if his mind agrees with this desire, then he undoubtedly commits a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 3. When anger is contrary to heavenly love, it is a mortal sin, but this is not the case in all cases, as is evident from what we have said above.

Section 4. Is anger the most grievous sin?

The fourth situation is as follows.

Objection 1. Anger seems to be the most grievous sin. After all, Chrysostom said that "there is nothing more repulsive than the sight of anger, and more ugly than the face of cruelty, and even more so - the cruelty of the soul" ⁴⁸⁵ . Therefore, anger is the most serious sin.

Objection 2. Further, it seems that the more harm sin causes, the more grievous it is; in fact, Augustine says that "that which causes harm is considered evil" ⁴⁸⁶ . But anger does the most harm, because it deprives a person of the mind that allows him to control himself; thus, Chrysostom says that “anger is no different from madness; as long as he acts, he is a demon, exhausting even more than any demon. ⁴⁸⁷ . Therefore, anger is the most serious sin.

Objection 3. Further, internal motions are judged by their external effects. But the consequence of anger is the gravest of sins, murder. Therefore, anger is the most serious sin.

This contradicts the following: anger is comparable to hatred like a twig - with a log, because, as Augustine says in his statute, "lest anger turn into hatred and the twig grow into a log." Therefore, anger is not the most serious sin.

I answer: As has already been said (2), the disorder of anger can be considered in two respects, namely, in relation to the improper object and in relation to the improper mode of anger. As regards the object it desires, anger does not seem to be too sinful, since anger desires evil - the punishment of some person under the aspect of goodness, namely revenge. Indeed, from the side of wanting evil, the sin of anger is similar to those sins that wish evil on one's neighbor, such as hatred and envy, but while the hater wishes harm to another absolutely, and the envious one wishes harm to him because of the desire for his own glory, the angry one wishes him evil under the aspect of vengeance alone. Hence it is evident that hatred is worse than envy, and envy worse than anger, since it is worse to desire evil for the sake of evil than for the sake of good, and to desire evil for the sake of an external good such as honors or glory, than under the aspect of the administration of justice. From the side of goodness, under whose aspect the angry one desires evil, anger is like the sin of lust, which also strives for goodness. In this respect, and in the strict sense of the word, the sin of anger is also not as grievous as the sin of lust, since the good of justice, which the angry person strives for, is better than the good of pleasantness or benefit, which the subject of lust strives for. Therefore, the philosopher says that "intemperance in anger is less shameful than intemperance in impulses" ⁴⁸⁸ .

On the other hand, if we consider the disorder in relation to the mode of anger, then anger seems to acquire some superiority due to the strength and speed of its movement, according to what is said [in Scripture]: “Anger is cruel, rage is indomitable - but who can stand before jealousy » (Prov. 27:4). Therefore, Gregory says: “The heart, ulcerated with anger, is beating in convulsions, the body is trembling, the tongue is tangled, the face is on fire, the eyes, clouded with rage, do not recognize anyone, the tongue makes some meaningless sounds” ⁴⁸⁹ .

Reply to Objection 1. Chrysostom means the repulsive outward manifestations of anger arising from the fury of anger.

Reply to Objection 2. This argument refers to the disordered movement of anger, which, as has already been said, is due to its violence.

Reply to Objection 3. Hatred and envy are no less murderous than anger, but anger is less grievous insofar as, as shown above, it is connected with the aspect of justice.

Section 5. Has the Philosopher Correctly Defined the Types of Anger?

The situation with the fifth [provision] is as follows.

Objection 1. It seems that the philosopher, dividing the angry into "irascible", "bilious" and "relentless", or "irritable" ⁴⁹⁰ , defines the types of anger incorrectly. So, in his opinion, a person is said to be bilious when "he is irreconcilable and his anger lasts a long time." But this is clearly related to the circumstance of time. Therefore, it seems that anger can be distinguished in kind and in relation to other circumstances.

Objection 2. Further, he says that the "irritable" or "relentless" do not stop being angry "until they avenge or punish." But this is characteristic of the irreconcilability of anger. Therefore, it seems that irritability is the same as malice [or biliousness].

Objection 3. Further, the Lord mentions three degrees of anger when He says: “Whoever is angry with his brother ... is subject to judgment; who will say to his brother: “Cancer!” - subject to the Sanhedrin, and who will say: "Mad!" – subject to hellfire” (Matt. 5:22). But these degrees do not correlate with the above species. Therefore, it seems that the above division of anger is not proper.

This is contradicted by as follows: Gregory of Nyssa says that "there are three kinds of anger," namely, anger, which he calls "fury," as well as "malice," which "is a disease of the mind," and [finally] "vindictiveness. " But these three seem to match the three above. Indeed, he describes rage as "sharp and excited," which the philosopher appropriates to the "irascible"; "malice" he describes as "protracted and vindictive", which the philosopher assimilates to "bilious"; "vindictiveness" he describes as "waiting for an opportunity for revenge", which coincides with the philosopher's description of "irritable". Similarly distinguishes between [anger] and Damascus ⁴⁹¹ . Therefore, the above distinction of the philosopher is proper.

I answer: The above distinction can be attributed either to passion or directly to the sin of anger. Earlier, when examining the passions, we showed (ΙΙ–Ι, 46, 8) how it is connected with the passion of anger, and also what exactly Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene had in mind. Here we must make a distinction between these kinds in relation to the sin of wrath, in the sense in which they were given by the philosopher.

So the disorder of anger can be seen in relation to two things. First, with regard to the generation of anger, and then it is associated with "hot-tempered" people who fall into anger too quickly and for any reason. Secondly, with regard to the duration of anger, namely, that anger continues for an unnecessarily long time, which can be due to two things. Firstly, by the fact that the cause of anger, namely the damage caused, is stored in the memory of a person for too long, as a result of which a prolonged discontent arises, making him "despondent" and "bilious". Secondly, it may be associated with revenge, which the person stubbornly seeks; this is the case with "relentless" or "irritable" people who get angry until they are punished.

Reply to Objection 1. Wrath and intransigence in anger are not due to time, but to the inclination of a person, which is mainly taken into account in distinguishing the above types.

Reply to Objection 2. The anger of the "bilious" and "irritable" is long, but for different reasons. The anger of the “bilious” is stable due to the steady discontent that is kept in his soul for a long time, and since this anger does not break out, neither others can convince him to stop being angry, nor he himself to calm down, and therefore his anger stops only when when, over time, discontent is blotted out. On the other hand, the anger of the "irritable" is long because of his strong desire for revenge, which does not disappear with time and can only be calmed by revenge.

Reply to Objection 3. The degrees of anger mentioned by the Lord do not refer to different types of anger, but to the [different stages] in the flow of the human act itself. In fact, the first degree is an internal plan, in relation to which He says: "Everyone who is angry with his brother." The second degree is connected with that outward manifestation of anger that precedes the emergence of a consequence, in relation to which He says: “Who will say to his brother:“ Cancer! ”, Which word is an angry exclamation. The third degree is connected with the emergence of the consequences of internally conceived sin. Then, the consequence of anger is harm done under the aspect of revenge to another, and the least of these is that which is inflicted verbally, in relation to which He says: "Who will say:" Mad! From this it is obvious that the second degree somewhat aggravates the first, and the third - the first and second together, and therefore if the first is a mortal sin, as is the case in the case mentioned: Lord, which we spoke of above (3), then the rest and even more so. Therefore, for each of them there is a certain punishment. In the first case, a "judgment" is appointed, which is the least severe [punishment], since, according to Augustine, "where there is a court, there is always an opportunity to justify"; in the second case, a “Sanhedrin” [that is, a “council”] is appointed, at which “judges deliberate on what the punishment should be”; in the third case, [the punishment itself, namely] “gehenna fiery,” that is, “eternal condemnation " ⁴⁹² .

Section 6. Shall anger be numbered among the chief vices?

The situation with the sixth [provision] is as follows.

Objection 1. It seems that anger should not be counted among the chief vices. For anger is born of suffering, which is the chief vice known as laziness. Therefore, anger should not be counted among the main vices.

Objection 2. Further, hatred is a more serious sin than anger. Therefore, it should rather be ranked among the main vices, and not anger.

Objection 3. Further, a gloss on the words [of Scripture]: “A wrathful man starts a quarrel” (Prov. 29:22), says: “Anger is the gate to all vices; if they are closed, peace is assured to all virtues; if they are open, the soul is fully armed and ready for all sorts of atrocities. But the main vice does not give rise to all, but only some special sins. Therefore, anger should not be counted among the main vices.

This is contradicted by the following : Gregory lists anger among the chief vices ⁴⁹³ .

I answer: As has already been said (II-I, 84, 3), the main vice is considered to be the one from which many other vices arise. Then, many vices can be the result of anger for two reasons. The first must be seen from the side of the object, in which there is an aspect of desirability to the extent that revenge is desirable under the aspect of justice or goodness, which, as was shown above (4), is attractive because of its superiority. The second is to be seen from the side of his ardor, impelling the mind to rash decisions, leading to all sorts of disorderly actions. Hence it is evident that anger is the chief vice.

Reply to Objection 1. That suffering from which anger arises is not, for the most part, the vice of laziness, but the suffering that follows the injury.

Reply to Objection 2. As has already been said (118, 7; 148, 5; 153, 4; II-I, 84, 3), the idea of ​​the most desirable goal, for the sake of which many sins are committed, is connected with the concept of the main vice. . But the goal of anger, which desires evil under the aspect of goodness, is much more desirable than the goal of hatred, which desires evil under the aspect of evil, and therefore the vice of anger is more important than the vice of hatred.

Reply to Objection 3. Anger may be regarded as the gateway to all vices, incidentally, because it removes the obstacle to them, namely, it makes difficult the judgment of the mind, by which a person turns away from evil. He himself is the direct cause of certain special sins, which are called his daughters.

Article 7. Are the six daughters properly digested in anger?

The situation with the seventh [position] is as follows.

Objection 1. It seems that the six daughters, namely "strife, exaltation of the mind, insult, expression of dissatisfaction, indignation and blasphemy", anger is improperly assimilated. Indeed, Isidore considers blasphemy to be the daughter of pride. Therefore, she cannot be considered the daughter of wrath.

Objection 2. Further, as Augustine says in his Rule, anger breeds hatred. Therefore, she must be considered one of the daughters of wrath.

Objection 3. Further, "exalting the mind" seems to be the same as pride. But pride, according to Gregory, is not the daughter of vice, but "the mother of all vices" ⁴⁹⁴ . Therefore, the exaltation of the mind should not be considered the daughter of anger.

This is contradicted by the following; Gregory assimilates the anger of these daughters ⁴⁹⁵ .

I answer: anger can be considered in three ways. First, as being in thought, and the effect of such anger are two vices. The first is from the side of the one with whom a person is angry, but does not consider him worthy of influencing him in any way, and this is called "indignation." Another vice is on the part of the angry one himself, who devises various ways of revenge and fills his mind with such thoughts, according to what is said [in Scripture]: “Will a wise man . .. fill his belly with a scorching wind” (Job. 15: 2), and this called "exaltation of the mind."

Secondly, anger can be seen as verbally expressed, and as a result of such anger there is a twofold disorder. The first is that a person's anger is manifested in the way he speaks, as, for example, when he says to his brother: "Raka!" slurred speech. Another disorder is that a person bursts into insulting speeches, and if they are directed against God, then this is “blasphemy”, and if they are against a neighbor, then this is an “insult”.

Thirdly, anger can be considered as having found its continuation in deeds, and then it causes “strife”, by which one should understand all kinds of harm caused to one's neighbor in anger.

Reply to Objection 1. Man-conscious blasphemy springs from pride, by which man rebels against God, because, according to what is said [in Scripture], “The beginning of pride is the removal of a man from the Lord” (Sir. 10:14), that is, the refusal from His reverence, which is the first part of pride and from which blasphemy arises. The same blasphemy that a person falls into because of a disordered mind stems from anger.

Reply to Objection 2. Although hatred sometimes springs from anger, yet it has an antecedent cause which is the immediate [cause] of its generation, namely, displeasure, just as, on the other hand, love is generated by pleasure. Then, this discontent in some cases moves a person to anger, and in others to hatred. Therefore, hatred was properly internalized to laziness and not to anger.

Reply to Objection 3. The exaltation of the mind, which is here considered, is not considered the same as pride, but a kind of effort or a daring attempt to take revenge, and meanwhile courage is a vice that is contrary to courage.

Section 8. Is the vice opposite to anger that which arises from the insufficiency of anger?

The situation with the eighth [provision] is as follows.

Objection 1. It seems that anger does not have an opposite vice that would arise from the lack of anger. Indeed, no vice can make us like God. But a person, having completely rid himself of anger, is likened to God, Who judges “indulgently” (Wisdom 12:18). Therefore, the complete absence of anger is not a vice.

Objection 2. Further, the absence of that which is of no use cannot be a vice. But in the movement of anger, as Seneca proves in his book On Anger, there is no use. Therefore, it seems that the absence of anger is not a vice.

Objection 3. Further, according to Dionysius, "human evil is madness" ⁴⁹⁶ . But the judgment of the mind is not weakened by the absence of this or that movement of anger. Therefore, lack of anger is not a vice.

This is contradicted by as follows: Chrysostom says: “He who does not get angry when he should, sins. For unreasonable patience is a breeding ground for many vices, indulges negligence and incites to bad deeds not only evil, but often good.

I answer: Anger can be understood in two ways. First, as a mere movement of the will, whereby the punishment is imposed, not under the influence of passion, but in consequence of the judgment of reason, in which case the lack of anger is certainly a sin. This is how Chrysostom understands anger, because he says: “If anger is justified, then this is no longer anger, but a judgment. For in the strict sense of the word, anger means the movement of passion” (after all, when a person is reasonably angry, his anger is no longer driven by passion, and therefore he considers it a judgment, and not anger). Secondly, anger can be understood as a movement of sensual desire, which is accompanied by passion conditioned by bodily change. This movement in man will necessarily follow the movement of his will, since the lower desire, if not hindered, will certainly follow the movement of the higher. Therefore, the movement of anger in sensual desire is generally insufficient only when the movement of the will is insufficient or weak. Therefore, the insufficiency of the passion of anger is vicious to the same extent as the [violent] insufficiency of the movement of the will to inflict punishment in accordance with the judgment of reason.

Reply to Objection 1. He who does not get angry even when he should be angry is likened to God from the side of impassivity, but not from the side of divine punishment, according to [right] judgment.

Reply to Objection 2. The passion of anger, like all other movements of sensuous desire, is useful insofar as it contributes to the more rapid fulfillment of what is prescribed by reason (otherwise sensual desire in man would be useless, but meanwhile "nature does nothing in vain" ⁴⁹⁷ ).

Reply to Objection 3. The disorder of actions means that the judgment of the human mind causes not only the mere movement of the will, but also passion in sensual desire, as has already been said. And since the elimination of the effect indicates the elimination of the cause, the insufficiency of anger indicates the insufficiency of the judgment of the mind.

* * *

⁴⁷²

De Div. Nom. IV, 32.

⁴⁷³

Ethic. VII, 7.

⁴⁷⁴

Moral. V.

⁴⁷⁵

Ethic. II, 6. Aristotle speaks of "gloating."

⁴⁷⁶

De Civ. Dei IX, 4.

⁴⁷⁷

Moral. V.

⁴⁷⁸

Ibid.

⁴⁷⁹

Ibid.

⁴⁸⁰

Ethic. II, 4.

⁴⁸¹

De Lib. Arb. III.

⁴⁸²

Ethic. VII, 7.

⁴⁸³

De Fide Orth. II.

⁴⁸⁴

Ethic. II, 4.

⁴⁸⁵

Hom.

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